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STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE NEW MEXICO SOLID
WASTE ACT: A COMPARISON WITH CERCLA*
RICHARD L.C. VIRTUE**
WILLIAM R. BRANCARD***

I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW MEXICO SOLID WASTE ACT
STRICT LIABILITY PROVISIONS
Effective March 5, 1990, section 34 of the Solid Waste Act' ("Act")

adopted a strict liability standard with respect to liability for payment

of costs of cleaning up contamination resulting from the disposal of solid
' 2
waste. Virtually all parties associated with a "solid waste facility,
including past and present owners, operators, permittees of the facility,

and transporters and generators of contaminated waste, are caught in
this strict liability net. In addition, the Act provides the state with the
power to require almost all of these parties to conduct the cleanup
themselves under threat of substantial penalties. As a result, the Act will
have a considerable impact not only on the past and present parties

associated with present and former solid waste facilities, but also on the

ability to transfer, mortgage or use any property that was once used for
the disposal of solid waste.
The enactment of the strict liability provision of the Act 3 establishes
a strong environmental protection policy in New Mexico and, at the same
time, creates numerous legal and practical issues related to implementation
of that policy. 4 This article analyzes several major legal and practical
. * The authors would like to express their appreciation to Murray N. Thayer for his assistance
in the preparation of this article.
** University of Oklahoma (B.A., with distinction, 1969); University of Michigan (J.D., 1972);
admitted to New Mexico bar, 1972. Currently a shareholder with Sutin, Thayer & Browne, P.C.,
Santa Fe, New Mexico.
*** Hamilton College (B.A., magna cum laude, 1979); London School of Economics, London,
England; Harvard University (J.D., cum laude, 1987). Admitted to New Mexico bar, 1987. Formerly
an associate with Sutin, Thayer & Browne, P.C.; currently Assistant Attorney General with the
State of New Mexico. The views in this article are those of the author and do not represent the
position of the office of the Attorney General on any issue.
1. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-9-1 to -42 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
2. Id. § 74-9-3.
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) [hereinafter section 34].
4. The Act was introduced as Senate Bill 2 in the 1990 legislative session and was revised twice
in the format of committee substitute bills. The first major revisions were embodied in Senate
Judiciary Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 2 ("Senate Judiciary Committee Substitute"), which
made substantial revisions to section 34. The Senate Conservation Committee Substitute for Senate
Judiciary Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 2 ("Senate Conservation Committee Substitute") did
not change any of the substantial revisions made by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Several
amendments were made to the bill in the House, none of which affected section 34. A prior version
of the Act was adopted by the New Mexico legislature in 1989, but was vetoed by the Governor.
The 1989 Solid Waste Act did not contain liability provisions such as those found in section 34 of
the Act.
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issues created by section 34 and proposes methods of addressing those
issues.
Section 34 gives the New Mexico Environment Department ("Environment Department") the power to order a "responsible party" to remove
and take remedial action with respect to a release or threatened release
of "contaminants" from a "solid waste facility." If a responsible party
does not provide for removal or remedial action upon order of the
Secretary of Environment Department, that person may be liable for
punitive damages in an amount up to three times the amount of costs
incurred as a result of the failure of the responsible party to take the
action ordered. 5 Further, punitive damages are assessed in addition to
the costs of removal and remedial action. 6
The owner or operator of a solid waste facility, any person having a
permit issued pursuant to the Solid Waste Act or the Environmental
Improvement Act, 7 and any person "otherwise authorized to accept solid
waste or disposal or transformation" under regulations adopted by the
New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board may be held strictly
liable for cleanup costs. 8 In addition, any person who accepted any solid
waste for transport to the facility is strictly liable for environmental
damage. 9 Finally, section 34 provides that any person who "arranged
for" disposal, treatment or transportation for disposal or treatment of
solid waste owned or possessed by that person is subject to strict liability.' 0
Courts must apportion responsibility for cleanup costs among multiple
parties found liable under the strict liability provisions in accordance with
"equitable principles."" An owner who can establish that at the time
he acquired the property he did not know and had no reason to know
that the property had been used for a solid waste facility can employ
the "innocent purchaser" defense, the major defense to strict liability. 2
The strict liability provision contains broad ranging implications for
both the public and private sector. Anyone involved in the disposal of
solid waste is potentially liable for releases of solid waste that damage
the environment. The operators of municipal and county landfill facilities,
being the principal operators of solid waste facilities in New Mexico,
face the greatest potential liability under the Act.
In contrast to the remainder of the Solid Waste Act, which focuses
on the future development of an environmentally safe solid waste management program for the state, section 34 creates liability for contamination related to the disposal of solid waste not only in the future but
also in the past. The result is a powerful enforcement tool that allows

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
Id.
Id. §§ 74-1-1 to -10.
Id. § 74-9-34(B)(4).
Id. § 74-9-34(B)(6).
Id. § 74-9-34(B)(5).
Id. § 74-9-34(E).
Id. § 74-9-34(C)(2)(a).
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the state to require responsible parties to either take remedial action or
pay for remedial action taken by the government for any pollution related
to any present or prior disposal of solid waste. By applying a strict
liability standard to a list of "responsible parties" who are defined by
their connection to the source of the contamination, the statute imposes
liability on parties regardless of whether their actions actually caused the
contamination or whether they acted in compliance with any rules applicable to the disposal of solid waste.
The response and liability provisions of the Act are, in part, analogous
to those provided in the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response
3
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund").' In fact,
some of the language in section 34 of the Act appears to have been4
taken directly from the liability and definition provisions of CERCLA.'
A major focus of this article will be to compare the Act's and CERCLA's
liability provisions and to analyze whether the implementation and interpretation of CERCLA by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and the federal courts provide useful examples for
implementing and interpreting the Act.
II.

IS STRICT LIABILITY RETROACTIVE?

The legislature did not specifically address whether the strict liability
provision applies to the costs of removal or remedial action resulting
from a release which occurred prior to its effective date. Nothing in
section 34 "bars or replaces any cause of action available to any person
that existed before its enactment."' 5 The causes of action created by
section 34 are "supplemental to existing causes of action.' 6 Section 73
of the Act, on the other hand, provides that enforcement action taken
"shall be valid if based upon an act or failure to act that violated a
7
provision of law in effect at the time of the act or failure to act.' 7
Thus, section 73 implies that an enforcement action to recover cleanup
costs for damage resulting from a release which occurred prior to the
effective date of the Act would be governed by the law in effect on the
date of the release and not the effective date of the Act.
In most situations where strict liability under section 34 cannot be
imposed, the state will be able to claim causes of action under other
laws. If the solid waste facility discharged any significant quantities of
water contaminants, the owner or operator of the facility may be subject
to liability under the Water Quality Act.' A release of hazardous substances or hazardous waste may create liability under CERCLA or the

13. 42 U.S.C.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

§§ 9601-75 (1980).

Id. §§ 9601, 9607.
N.M. STAT. ANw. § 74-9-34(H) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
Id.
Id. § 74-9-1 note (savings clauses).
Water Quality Control Commission Regulation 1-203 (1988).
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New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act. 19 The state may also bring a public
nuisance cause of action. 20
A different issue is created by a release which commenced prior to
the effective date of the Act but continued to exist beyond the effective
date. In such a situation, the Act would clearly apply to costs of removal
or remedial action with respect to contamination occurring after the
effective date of the Act. As a practical matter, because of the difficulty
in establishing that the contamination occurred prior to the effective date
of the Act, it may only be necessary to establish that the release was
in existence after the effective date of the Act.
III.

SCOPE OF LIABILITY - TO WHAT TYPE OF ACTIVITY
DOES STRICT LIABILITY APPLY?

The responsible parties under section 34 can be required to either
conduct a cleanup or reimburse a governmental entity for its costs of
conducting a cleanup "because of a release or threatened release of
contaminants from a solid waste facility." ' 21 The scope of liability is both
broad and vague. Certain terms are capable of broad interpretation while
others are undefined.
"Release" is not defined by the Act but is broadly defined by two
recently enacted New Mexico environmental laws. Both the New Mexico
Hazardous Chemicals Information Act 22 and CERCLA include as a "release" '!any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing" or the
abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers and other closed recepticles.23 The Ground Water Protection Act 24 only pertains to "releases"
from underground storage but includes "spilling, leaking, emitting, discharging, escaping, leaching or disposing." 2 5 Section 34 also authorizes
the Environment Department to recover the costs of remedial action taken
with respect to a "threatened release." A "threatened release" is, of
course, even broader and more vague than "release. ' 26
The term "contaminants" is not defined by the Act or by any other
New Mexico environmental statute. The Air Quality Control Act contains
a definition of "air contaminants" that refers to specific contaminants
(e.g., particulate matter, ash, dust), 27 while the Water Quality Act defines

19. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4-1 to -13 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
20. See id. §§ 30-8-1 to -9 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
21. Id. § 74-9-34(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
22. Id. §§ 74-4E-1 to -9.
23. Id. § 74-4E-3(G); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1980).
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-6B-2 to -11 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
25. Id. § 74-6B-3(H).
26. However, while section 34 of the Act refers to costs incurred by the state responding to a
release or threatened release, section 36 only gives the Environment Department the power to issue
a corrective action order when the Environment Department determines that there has been a release
into the environment from a solid waste facility. Id. § 74-9-36(D).
27. Id. § 74-2-2(A).
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"water contaminants" as "any substance which alters the physical, chemical or biological qualities of water.'"'
The broad definition of "solid waste facility" in the Act may extend
the liability provisions to hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pieces of
property in New Mexico. A solid waste facility means:
[Any public or private system, facility, location, improvements on
the land, structures or other appurtenances or methods used for
processing, transformation, recycling or disposal of solid waste, inrecovery
cluding landfill disposal facilities, transfer stations, resource
29
specified.
not
facilities
similar
other
and
incinerators
facilities,
"Solid waste" is also broadly defined to include any garbage or refuse,
30
but excludes certain agricultural, mining, hazardous and other wastes.
Simply applying the term "solid waste facility" -to landfills creates a
large number of potential sources of liability. As of August 1989,
109 municipal solid waste landfills were open and registered, but close
to that number had ceased operation in the past few years." Add to
this list the number of unregistered landfills or landfills that were closed
prior to any registration requirement and the number reaches several
hundred. If the definition of "any . . .location ... used for processing,
transformation, recycling or disposal of solid waste" is literally applied,
then junk yards, salvage operations, and any arroyo, pit or other location
where garbage has been deposited may be included, and the number of
such facilities probably reaches into the thousands.
Landfills and dumps are already recognized as one of the most serious
causes of soil and groundwater contamination. Nationwide, roughly twenty
percent of the CERCLA National Priorities List, or Superfund, sites are
municipal landfills. 3 2 The Lee Acres landfill near Farmington is one of
33
the ten New Mexico Superfund sites. Of the approximately 300 New
Mexico properties listed on the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Information System ("CERCLIS"), which
are the subject of EPA Superfund program investigations, over fifty are
readily identifiable as landfills. Therefore, a significant percentage of
solid waste facilities as defined by the Act are sources of potential liability
for the responsible parties associated with them. Most of the older
facilities, particularly the illegal or unregulated ones, contained no barriers
and even the best constructed landfills
to the leaching of contaminants,
34
point.
some
at
may leak

28. Id. § 74-6-2(A).
29. Id. § 74-9-3(P).
30. Id. § 74-9-3(N).
(1990)
31. NEW MExico FIRST, NEW MEXICO's ENVIRONMENT: DANCE oF THE INTERESTS 53
[hereinafter NEW MExico FiRsT].
LAW. 79
32. Steinzor, Local Governments and Superfund: Who Will Pay the Tab?, 22 URB.
(1990).
30, 1990).
33. 55 Fed. Reg. 35,502 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300) (proposed Aug.
53.
at
31,
note
supra
FIRST,
MEXIco
NEW
34.
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IDENTIFYING THE PLAYERS - WHO IS SUBJECT TO
STRICT LIABILITY?

Section 34 lists those persons subject to strict liability. In addition to
owners, operators and permit holders,3 5 section 34 attempts to extend
liability to virtually any person who is involved in any way with the
process of disposing of waste at a solid waste facility where a release
or threatened release occurs.
Subsection B(4) imposes liability on any person, who at the time of
the disposal of "any solid waste" in a facility where a release or threatened
release occurs, owned, operated, or had a permit or registration certificate
to operate the facility. This section extends the spectre of strict liability
to a responsible party even where the responsible party can establish that
no release or threatened release occurred during the time of its ownership,
operation, or holding of a permit or registration certificate.
Subsection B(5) has an even broader reach. That section imposes liability
upon any person who "arranged for" the disposal, treatment or transportation of solid waste "owned or possessed by that person" and disposed
of in the facility where the release or threatened release occurs. 3 6 This
provision would, theoretically, impose liability on citizens who "arrange
for" the transportation and disposal by using a municipal or private
solid waste collection and disposal service. All citizens who arranged for
the disposal of solid waste at a facility at which a release or threatened
release occurs face the threat of liability for costs of removal and remedial
action.
Section 34 imposes liability upon "any generator" without imposing
any connection to the solid waste facility.17 The term "generator" is
defined as a governmental entity "in which any solid waste disposed of
in a solid waste facility in New Mexico originated." 3 Subsection D of
section 34 as originally contained in Senate Bill 2 provided that recovery
of costs was required to be enforced against responsible parties, not
generators. 3 9 Responsible parties are essentially private entities who own
or operate a facility. By removing the priority, the legislature evidenced
an intent that governmental entities owning or operating or otherwise
possessing a permit for a solid waste facility be subject to sharing with
private parties using the facility the responsibility for cleanup. This
provision provides a much stronger incentive than the original provision
to avoid releases, given the fact that most solid waste facilities in this
state are operated by local governments. Thus, all governmental entities,
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1990). Permit holders include any person having
been issued a permit under the Act or the Environmental Improvement Act, or any person otherwise
authorized to accept solid waste for disposal or transformation under regulations adopted by the
Environmental Improvement Board under the Environmental Improvement Act. Id.
36. Id. § 74-9-34(B)(5).
37. Id. § 74-9-34(B)(7).
38. Id. § 74-9-34. The term "generator" includes the United States, a state or any agency,
department, instrumentality, office, institution or political subdivision of the state.
39. Senate Bill 2, 1990 Legislative Session.
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including the federal government, the state, the municipalities and counties, in which solid waste was generated may presumably be held strictly
liable for cleanup costs with respect to a release or threatened release if
the solid waste disposed of at the facility at which the release occurred
originated within its territorial limits. Finally, the Act adds an additional
category of responsible party-insurers or guarantors of an owner or
operator where the owner or operator is in bankruptcy 4°or where jurisdiction over the owner or operator cannot be obtained.
The list of responsible parties in section 34 is essentially the same as
4
major exceptions: subsection B
provided for in CERCLA, ' with two
42 and (2) generators. 43 Presumably,
imposes liability on (1) permit holders
the amendments which added permit holders were designed to extend
liability to persons who originally obtain a permit but contract for the
operation of a facility. Municipalities and counties would be the most
likely to incur liability under these provisions. These sections may have
very little practical impact because regulations promulgated by the New
Mexico Environmental Improvement Board require that persons who shall
"operate" a new facility must have a permit issued by the Secretary of
44
the Envornment Department ("Secretary"). If a permit is transferred,
must demonstrate that it has
regulations require that the new permittee
"ownership or control" of the facility. 4 Few, if any, situations come
to mind where a person would be a permit holder subject to liability
and would not also be an owner or operator.
The provisions of section 34 create an inextricable entanglement of
potentially responsible parties. Section 34 would substantially benefit from
more explicit procedures for identifying potentially responsible parties
and allocating liability among those parties. Procedures similar to those
adopted under CERCLA, discussed below, should be seriously considered
with respect to implementation of section 34.
V.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR APPORTIONMENT
OF LIABILITY AND DETERMINATION OF APPROPRIATE
REMOVAL AND REMEDIAL ACTION

The Provisions of the Act
Section 34 speaks only generally about the procedures for allocating
liability among responsible parties and determining the nature and extent
that reof removal and remedial action. Section 34(B) simply provides 46
Costs
"costs."
for
liable
strictly
are
sponsible parties and generators

A.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-36(F) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
See 42 U.S.C § 9607(a) (1980).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(B)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
Id. § 74-9-34(B)(7).
Solid Waste Management Regulations § 201.
Id. § 205.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
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are defined in section 34(A)(3) to mean the "costs of removal or remedial
action" incurred by government "because of a release or threatened
release of contaminants from a solid waste facility." 47 Subsection D states
that any "responsible party" that is "liable for a release or threatened
release" is "liable for punitive damages" if it fails to "properly provide
removal or remedial action upon order of the director." 48
Subsections B and D of section 34, when read together, indicate that
the Secretary has the power: (1) to make a determination that a responsible
party or parties are liable for a release and order a responsible party or
parties to take "removal or remedial action"; and (2) to bring an action
to recover treble punitive damages measured by the "costs incurred as
a result of failure to take proper action." Implicit in the provisions of
section 34 is the concept that the state or the appropriate political subdivision may proceed with removal or remedial action to recover: (1) any
"costs"; and (2) "punitive damages" not to exceed three times
the amount
of "costs." However, no specified procedure for the exercise of removal
or remedial action by the government or recovery of "costs" incurred
by the government for such removal or remedial action is found in
section 34. The section simply states that the court has the authority to
apportion responsibility for "costs or damages or both among defendants
found liable.' " 49 Thus, the Secretary has no specific authority to issue
an administrative order to bring suit to recover costs, but section 34 gives
the court authority to apportion both "costs" and "damages."
Section 36 of the Act sheds some light on the procedures for enforcement. That section provides the Secretary with the authority to require
"corrective action" or any "other response measures" he deems
necessary
to protect human health or the environment with respect to releases.5 0
Section 36 provides some key missing links to the enforcement authority
set forth in section 34. Subsection D of section 36 provides that the
Secretary may, alternatively, commence an action in district court for
the district in which the facility is located for "appropriate relief."'" This
provision should be construed to provide authority for the Secretary to
initiate an action to recover "costs," filling the void in section 34 which
provides only for interaction of a court proceeding to recover "damages."
Section 36 requires a corrective action order to specify a time for compliance and to state with "reasonable specificity" the nature of the
required corrective action or other response measure . 2 The "corrective
action or other response measure" should encompass "removal or remedial
action" authorized to be ordered by section 34.13
47. Id. § 74-9-34(A)(3).
48. Id. § 74-9-34(D).
49. Id. § 74-9-34(E).
50. Id. § 74-9-36(D). Corrective action is authorized only for present and past releases;
whereas
section 34 provides for cost recovery for actions taken to prevent "threatened" releases.
51. Id. § 74-9-36(D).
52. Id. § 74-9-36(E).
53. Id. Subsection E also provides for a penalty of $5,000 per day for each day of non-compliance
with a corrective action order. Such penalties are in addition to cleanup costs and punitive
damages
provided for in section 34.
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Neither section 34 nor section 36 specifically authorize the government
to clean up environmental damage from releases, nor do they provide
procedures or requirements related to the determination of responsible
parties incurring liability for cleanup costs or the allocation of responsibility for such costs. Such procedures and requirements should be
provided for if the Act is to be effectively administered.
The Secretary has an ideal source of guidance in adopting procedures
governing enforcement of the Act by looking to the provisions for
determination of primarily responsible parties and the allocation of liability
among primarily responsible parties provided for in CERCLA and in the
National Contingency Plans4 adopted by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency pursuant to CERCLA. Enforcement of CERCLA now
benefits from specific requirements related to the administrative process
of selection of remedies and allocation of liability, many of which were
adopted as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 ("SARA")" and amendments to the National Contingency Plan
mandated by SARA. s
CERCLA Administrative Procedures
7
CERCLA and the National Contingency Plan ("Plan") provide administrative procedures for discovery and identification of a release or
threatened release of contaminants, preliminary assessment and evaluation
of a release or threatened release, determination of an appropriate response, identification of responsible parties, and allocation of liability
among the parties.58 Administration and enforcement of the Act would
benefit strongly from adoption of procedures similar to those adopted
under CERCLA and the. Plan.
B.

1. Preliminary Assessment and Evaluation
Once a release or threatened release has been discovered and the
government has been notified, the Plan requires a preliminary assessment
of the release or threatened release to determine whether there 59is an
"imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare." The
preliminary assessment may include identification of the sources and nature
of the release or potential release, evaluation of the threat to public
health, evaluation of the magnitude of the release and evaluation of
whether removal is necessary. 6° During the preliminary assessment an on61
site inspection may be conducted. An on-site inspection would include

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

40 C.F.R. § 300 (1989).
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1988).
40 C.F.R. § 300 (1989).
Id. §§ 300.61-.71.
Id. § 300.61.
Id. § 300.64.
Id.
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obtaining samples, determining the contaminants released, and identifiying
the potential or actual threats to public health and welfare. 62 If it is
determined that a release or threatened release is a threat to public health
and welfare, the government must determine what response, if any, is
63
necessary.
2. Determining Appropriate Response
Once it is determined that a response to a release or threatened release
is necessary, the Plan requires a determination of whether removal actions
are necessary or whether remedial actions are necessary. 4 The government
may consider the following in determining the appropriateness of a
removal action: (1) actual or potential exposure to pollution by populations, animals, or the food chain; (2) actual or potential exposure of
drinking water or sensitive ecosystems to hazardous substances;
(3) pollutants which may potentially migrate or are near the surface;
(4) the threat of fire or explosions; and (5) pollutants in repositories which
may pose a threat.65 If the preliminary assessment indicates that removal
action is not necessary or will not fully address the threat or potential
threat imposed by a release, the government may initiate a site evaluation
to determine what remedial actions are necessary.66 The Plan provides
for a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study to determine the nature
and extent of the threat presented by the release and to evaluate the
possible remedies. 67 The feasibility study is an in-depth analysis of the
various remedial actions which could be used to clean up the site. The
feasibility study process involves balancing of the benefits and costs of
each potential remedy." Cost, engineering feasibility, and effectiveness
of remedy must all be considered in the feasibility study.6 9
3.

Participation of Responsible Parties - Special Notice Procedures
and Non-Binding Preliminary Allocations of Responsibility
The Plan provides procedures under which potentially responsible parties
are notified of the response process and are given an opportunity to
participate. 70 Provision should be made under the New Mexico Solid
Waste Act for allowing responsible parties to participate in a remedial
investigation/feasibility study process. Allowing responsible parties to be
involved in the process at an early stage, even before the entry of an
order requiring corrective action, will potentially eliminate needless litigation and negotiations concerning the appropriateness of remedies se-

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. §

300.65(e).
300.65(a)(2).
300.66.

300.65.
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lected and allocation of liability for the costs. The negotiation of the

remedy and a detailed plan for implementation of the remedy is essential
to an orderly removal and remediation process.

The Act provides for the allocation of liability among the responsible
parties. Section 34 provides that "the court" shall allocate responsibility7
among the various parties in accordance with "equitable principles"; '
however, as a practical matter the Secretary must initially conduct such
an allocation subject to judicial review. Again, use of the techniques
provided for in CERCLA would be beneficial to administration and
enforcement of the Act.
parties. 72
The Plan provides a special procedure to notify responsible
Through use of a special notice procedure, the Environment Department
could notify potentially responsible parties of the fact that it is interested
in reaching a settlement concerning cleanup. In addition, the Environment
Department could simply send an informal request letter that asks each
responsible party to take a positive position with respect to its potential
liability and initiate a settlement process. The special notice procedure
could be used to allow for the initiation of the remedial investigation/
feasibility study process or to shortcut that process by proposing a response
action where appropriate. Such a procedure would give the parties an
appropriate opportunity to begin the remedial investigation/feasibility
study process or to take its own appropriate response action. If no
response is made to the special notice letter, then the Environment
Department could enter its corrective action order. Threat of such an
order, and the imposition of punitive damages if corrective action is not
taken "without sufficient cause," provide substantial incentives to negotiate a settlement.
Another enforcement tbol provided under CERCLA that may be useful
in enforcing the Act is the use of non-binding preliminary allocations
of responsibility. 73 The allocation could be used by the Environment
Department after the conduct of a remedial investigation/feasibility study
to allocate responsibility among the parties and, thus, encourage the
parties to settle. A non-binding preliminary allocation could be prepared
as part of the remedial investigation/feasibility study process, and would
be required to be based upon "equitable principles." Issuance of a nonbinding preliminary allocation at an early date would have the effect of
giving the parties a better idea of their potential liability, including the
elimination of liability for parties whose liability is de minimus.
4. Use of Records of Decision and Remedial Action Plans
Based upon the remedial investigation and feasibility study and any
comments received by interested parties in connection with those efforts,
the Environment Department should develop a record of decision in
support of the selection of a remedy for cleanup. An orderly process
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
72. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.61, 300.65 (1989).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1986).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

under which the remedial investigation and feasibility study and related
documents are incorporated into the record, official comments received
by interested parties are incorporated into the record, and a final decision
of the Environment Department is made with respect to selection of a
remedy should be accomplished. This record would then form the basis
for administrative appeal. Because the Act requires a public hearing prior
to the taking of an enforcement action, such administrative procedure
might also include, as a final step, a hearing at which interested parties
would be allowed to present evidence. After the record of decision is
completed, the Secretary should propose a remedial action plan. Only
after the steps discussed above are followed should the Director enter
an order requiring corrective action. If such a procedure is not developed
in the form of regulations or administrative policy, the Environment
Department will undoubtedly enter orders requiring corrective action which
may be found to be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious by responsible
parties, and litigation will ensue. The Act provides thdt punitive damages
apply only if the party "fails without sufficient cause" to properly provide
removal or remedial action upon order of the Environment Department.7 4
Substantial litigation will undoubtedly ensue as to what constitutes "sufficient cause" to fail to comply with an order of the Secretary unless
appropriate administrative procedures are developed.
VI. DEFENSES TO LIABILITY
The limited defenses to liability under the Act mirror, and in many
cases copy, the defenses to liability under CERCLA.1 Certain defenses
available under CERCLA, however, such as the third party and secured
party defenses, are not available under the Act, while certain defenses
applicable to governmental entities are more expansive under the Act
than under CERCLA. Where the provisions of the Act mirror those of
CERCLA, federal court interpretations provide further insight. New Mexico courts have long held that when construing statutory provisions
adopted from other jurisdictions, including federal law, the New Mexico
courts will look to the original jurisdiction for construction of the law.7 6
The Act provides all responsible parties with two categories of defenses
that the responsible party must prove by a preponderence of evidence.
The first category of defenses is available when the responsible party
can prove that the contamination was caused solely by certain external
forces, i.e., an act of God or act of war. 76 The second category of
defenses pertains to certain types of facility owners, including the socalled "innocent purchaser," the governmental entity which obtains the
74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1980).
76. Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010 (1944); Wellborn Paint Mfg. Co. v. New
Mexico Employment Sec. Dept., 101 N.M. 534, 685 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1984); Featherstone v.
Bureau of Revenue, 58 N.M. 557, 273 P.2d 752 (1954) (follow construction of similar provision
in federal revenue act); Benavidez v. Benavidez, 99 N.M. 535, 660 P.2d 1017 (1983) (follow construction of identical federal rule of civil procedure).
77. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(C)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
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fafacility involuntarily or by condemnation, and the inheritor of the
79
78 The external forces defenses are also found in CERCLA.
cility.
The Act does not, however, include the third, and most significant,
CERCLA external forces defense: the third party defense .80 Under CERCLA, a potentially responsible party is not liable for the damages caused
solely by the act or omission of a third party who is not an employee,
agent or a party to a contractual relationship with the potentially responsible party. The third party defense is intended to cover the "midnight
dumpers" who release hazardous substances onto another's land without
permission or knowledge of the landowner. To claim the defense, the
landowner must show that they took precautions against "foreseeable
acts" of third parties. 8
In New Mexico, where solid waste is continuously disposed on vacant
land without the landowner's permission or knowledge, the third party
defense could have great application. Instead, by failing to include a
third party defense, the Act may impose significant liability on the victims
of midnight dumpers. When the definition of "solid waste facility"
8' 2
includes any "location . .. used for ... disposal of solid waste," the
hundreds, maybe thousands, of arroyos filled with trash certainly qualify
as solid waste facilities. The owners of large tracts of vacant land,
particularly those adjacent to, or within, urban areas, may face huge
liabilities as contamination from these locations begins to migrate.
What remains in the Act then are the practically useless act of God
and act of war defenses. While certain acts of God, such as a flash
flood or tornado, may contribute to a release of contaminants, the burden
is on the responsible party to prove that the release and the resulting
damages were caused solely by the act of God. The responsible party
would presumably need to demonstrate that it had taken all required
and reasonable precautions.
The second category of defenses available under the Act are the "innocent landowner" defenses. These include any owner who:
(a) at the time he acquired the property, did not know and had no
reason to know that the property had been used for a solid waste
facility;
(b) is a governmental entity that acquired the property by escheat,
or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through
the exercise of eminent domain authority; or
3
(c) acquired the property by inheritance or devise.
This language is taken almost verbatim from the "innocent landowner"
defenses added to CERCLA by the Superfund Amendments and Reau-

78. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(C)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1980).
80. Id. § 9607(b)(3).
81. Id.
82. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-3(P) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
83. Id. § 74-9-34(C)(2).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 21

thorization Act of 1986. 4 In CERCLA, however, these defenses were
included as part of the third party defense instead of being listed as
separate defenses as they are in the Act. 85 A party claiming a CERCLA
third party defense is also under a burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it exercised due care once the contamination was
revealed and also took precautions against the foreseeable acts of third
parties. 86 A party would also lose the right to claim a CERCLA third
party defense if it obtained knowledge of the contamination during its
ownership and then failed to disclose the knowledge to a subsequent
purchaser. 87 No such requirements are necessary for anyone asserting the
innocent landowner defenses under the Act.
At first glance, the most significant landowner defense under the Act
is available to the purchaser who had no reason to know the property
had been used as a solid waste facility. The availability of this defense
will hinge on the definition of when a land purchaser "had no reason
to know" at the time they purchased the property. Under CERCLA,
specific guidelines are provided for establishing the "no reason to know"
qualification. The purchaser must have made, at the time of acquisition,
"all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the
property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an
effort to minimize liability.''8 Whether the inquiry was sufficient will
depend on the knowledge and experience of the purchaser, the obviousness
of the contamination, commonly known information on the property and
the relationship of the purchase price to market value. 89 Congress clearly
intended that the level of inquiry would be more substantial for commercial, as opposed to residential, transactions."
The requirement under CERCLA for "all appropriate inquiry," combined with the reluctance of the EPA to acknowledge innocence, has led
some to assert that the innocent purchaser defense is nearly impossible
to prove. 9' The EPA has used the requirements of the innocent purchaser
defense primarily as a means of determining eligibility for de minimus
settlements under section 122 of CERCLA. 92 The courts, however, have
refused to reject the possibility of a CERCLA innocent purchaser defense
in several situations involving older purchases and individual defendants. 93
Because the Act lacks a statutory definition of "had no reason to
know," a New Mexico court will have greater leeway in applying the

84. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1616 (1986).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(3), 9601(35) (1986).

86. Id. § 9607(b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b).
87. Id. § 9601(35)(C).
88. Id. § 9601(35)(B).
89. Id.
90. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADxN. NEws 3276, 3280 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. Rap. No. 99-962].
91. See, e.g., Mays, The Blessed State of Innocence - The Innocent Landowner Defense Under
Superfund, 18 CHEM. WASTE LIT. REP. 864 (Oct. 1989).
92. 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1986).
93. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur, Inc. Depot, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1082 (D. Idaho
1989); United States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
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innocent purchaser defense. New Mexico courts would also have the
option of applying the "all appropriate inquiry" standard found in
CERCLA. The failure of the New Mexico legislature to include the
standard in the Act cannot be viewed as an attempt to either broaden
or limit the defense.
With environmental assessments becoming more common in commercial
real estate transactions, the Environment Department will have a strong
argument that a significant amount of inquiry should be required before
the innocent purchaser defense can be successfully asserted in a recent
purchase of real property. If, however, the contaminated property was
purchased twenty, ten or even five years ago, when little attention was
paid to examining the environmental liabilities of real property, the
purchaser may stand a better chance of proving that no special inquiry
was required at the time of purchase. New Mexico courts may agree
with the growing
with Congress that the duty to investigate increases
94 Still, the presence of
contamination.
environmental
public awareness of
a landfill is generally obvious, and the purchaser may be hard pressed
to deny knowledge. The difficult situations include expanding urban areas
where old landfills were covered and the property was filled and levelled
so as to preclude easy identification of the landfill.
The other two landowner defenses may allow escapes for parties that
are not very "innocent." Unlike the "innocent purchaser" who cannot
know of the presence of a landfill on the property, the governmental
authority that condemns the property or the party that inherits the property
can be fully aware of the landfill without jeopardizing their liability
defense. The Act, unlike CERCLA, does not require these owners to
prove that they exercised due care with respect to the solid waste on
their property in order to assert the defense. If a closed, privately owned
and operated landfill is sold to a purchaser who should have known
about the landfill, then liability will pass to the purchaser; but if that
landfill is inherited by the next generation who knows of its existence
(but were not operators), then liability will not pass.
The position of the state or local governmental authority is somewhat
ambiguous. A county, for instance, that condemns land on which a closed
landfill is located will not become liable as an "owner" but will probably
95 Being liable only as a generator even
remain liable as a "generator."
though it owns the facility, however, allows the county to avoid the
treble punitive damages that the state can assess against "responsible
parties" which fail to provide remedial action when so ordered by the
Environment Department.96 "Responsible party" is defined in the liability
section of the Act to mean any liable party except generators.97 The
94. "The duty to inquire under this provision shall be judged as of the time of acquisition.
Defendants shall be held to a higher standard as public awareness of the hazards associated with
hazardous substances releases has grown .... H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 99-962, supra note 90, at
3280.
95. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
96. See id. § 74-9-34(D).
97. Id. § 74-9-34(A)(2).
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result is that the state or the local government can condemn solid waste
facilities for little cost, based on the potential liability reducing the market
value of the property, and not increase their overall liability under the
Act.
Further protection from liability is provided to the governmental authorities for emergency responses. The authorities will not be liable for
any costs or damages that result from any "actions taken in response
to an emergency created by the release or threatened release by or from
a solid waste facility owned by another person." 9 While this sentence
is taken almost verbatim from CERCLA, CERCLA limits this protection
and does not preclude liability for harms resulting from the gross negligence or intentional misconduct of the governmental entities.9 No such
limit is found in the Act.
Another important difference between liability defenses offered by the
Act and by CERCLA is the absence of a secured party exemption under
the Act. In the definition of "owner or operator," CERCLA provides
that the term "does not include a person, who, without participating in
the management of vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility."I 100 While recent
federal court decisions have construed this exemption narrowly, 0 1 some
protection from liability is offered to secured parties under CERCLA.
A party which holds title to contaminated property purely to protect its
security interest without any involvement in the management of the
property is subject to liability under the Act as an "owner,"'0 2 but is
potentially exempt from liability under CERCLA. 3
VII.

STANDARDS FOR APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
AMONG RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

Section 34 imposes liability for response costs on a large field of
potentially responsible parties. The question then becomes how will the
liability be allocated among the responsible parties. A responsible party
under the Act can become liable for response costs under two different
scenarios. First, the state or local authority can incur costs responding
to a release from a solid waste facility and then sue some or all of the
responsible parties for reimbursement of the response costs. Second, the
Environment Department can direct a responsible party to respond to a
release directly. In the first scenario, the issues include whether the liability
of the responsible parties is joint and several and whether the sued
responsible parties have a right of contribution against the unnamed
responsible parties. In the second scenario, the issues include whether

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. § 74-9-34(F).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1986).
Id. § 9601(20)(A).
See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(B)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
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the Act grants to the responsible parties who incur response costs a right
of action against the other responsible parties.
The Act is silent as to the imposition of joint and several liability and
the right of responsible parties to seek contribution. The Act does not
explicitly provide a private right of action. Instead, the Act only directs
a court to apportion costs and damages 4among the liable defendants in
"accordance with equitable principles.' A number of issues will remain
for the courts to address.
Joint and Several Liability
Congress originally was silent in CERCLA on the issues of joint and
several liability and a right of contribution. The goal of Congress was
to allow the courts to apply federal common law on a case-by-case
basis.105 The federal courts generally found joint and several liability and
a right to contribution. Congress later expressed its agreement with the
application of joint and several liability'06 and added a specific right of
contribution to CERCLA. 1 7
The federal courts found joint and several liability under CERCLA
by applying a traditional test of whether the multiple defendants caused
a single, indivisible harm. If multiple defendants did cause a single,
indivisible harm, then each potentially responsible party is subject to
liability for the entire harm.10m The harm generally flowed from the
commingling of different wastes that were generated, transported and
handled by a number of parties and therefore the harm was indivisible.
The burden is on the individual defendant to provide a rational basis
for apportioning the harm.1 9
A similar argument can be made for finding joint and several liability
under the Act. The list of responsible parties under the Act covers the
same categories as CERCLA and even adds a few (e.g., permit holders).
In a cost recovery situation, each responsible party would have made
contributions to a solid waste facility as a generator or transporter of
the waste or as an owner, operator or permit holder for the facility.
From the facility would have flowed a single, indivisible harm, i.e., the
release of contaminants into the environment.
But does the Act, which requires apportionment of damages by the
court, allow for joint and several liability? Reading the provision literally,
the apportionment applies only to costs and damages and not to liability.
If the liability is found to be joint and several, then the court will play

A.

104. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1990). Senate Bill 2 originally provided that
any costs or damages recovered under the strict liability provisions would be allocated based upon
the "proportional share of the total amount of solid waste treated, transported, or disposed of in
the solid waste facility." The final version of section 34 provides that liability is to be apportioned
by the court based upon "equitable principles."
105. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.l at 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmgN. NEws 2835, 2856 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 99-253].
106. H.R. REP. No. 99-253, supra note 105, at 74.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1986).
108. E.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
109. E.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

its statutory role by apportioning the full amount of costs and damages
among the joint tortfeasors. The issue then is whether a New Mexico
court will find joint and several liability in this situation.
Joint and several liability in New Mexico was dealt a severe blow when
the courts adopted the theory of comparative negligence." 0 The court of
appeals explicitly rejected the theory that a single, indivisible harm must
result in joint and several liability."' Because the theory of several liability
is premised on comparative fault, however, joint and several liability
appears to continue for strictly liable defendants except where the negligence of other parties (e.g., plaintiffs) contributed to the harm. 1 2
The New Mexico legislature acted in 1987 to both preserve the newly
implemented theory of several liability and retain some area for the theory
of joint and several liability.'" The statute carves out several situations
where joint and several liability can be applied. "' Two situations provide
support for a New Mexico court to adopt joint and several liability under
the Act. First, joint and several liability is applied by law to persons
strictly liable for defective products." 5 Second, the court can apply joint
and several liability to other situations not listed in the statute where
' 16
joint and several liability would have "a sound basis in public policy.""
A reasonable argument can be made that New Mexico courts should
impose joint and several liability under the Act because the responsible
parties are strictly liable and the imposition would serve the public policy
goals of the Act. The responsible parties are liable under the Act not
because they were negligent in their actions relating to the disposal of
solid waste, but merely because their actions were connected to a solid
waste disposal system which later caused contamination. The Act seeks
to hold responsible a large number of parties associated with the contaminated facility.
If joint and several liability is imposed, the state only needs to identify
a few responsible parties in a cost recovery or enforcement proceeding;
the named responsible parties, who face having to pay for the entire
cleanup, will be motivated to identify and join the unnamed responsible
parties in order to spread the costs. If several liability is imposed, the
state would be forced to litigate the apportionment of liability for each
liable party and would need to track down all liable parties in order to

110. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) (adopting comparative negligence); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982) (rejecting joint and several liability when comparative negligence
is used).
111.
Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
112. See Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc., 102 N.M. 614, 698 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985);
Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc., 100 N.M. 313, 670 P.2d 735 (1983) (apportioning fault
between negligent parties and strictly liable defendant).
113. 1987 N.M. Laws ch. 141 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3A-1, -2, 41-3-2, 52-1-10.1).
See generally Schultz & Occhialino, Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A
Commentary and Quasi-Legislative History, 18 N.M.L. REV. 483 (1988).
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
115. Id. § 41-3A-1(C)(3).
116. Id. § 41-3A-1(C)(4).

Winter 1990]

SOLID WASTE LIABILITY

receive full reimbursement for response costs. 1 7 Joint and several liability
would, therefore, promote the expeditious and cost effective cleanup of
contamination by reducing the cost and burden on the state and shifting
the incentive to the responsible parties.
Contribution and Apportionment
The right of contribution among joint tortfeasors exists when two or
more persons are liable to the same party for the same harm and one
joint tortfeasor has paid more than its equitable share of the common
liability." 8 Under CERCLA, the combination of joint and several liability
and the right of contribution allows the federal government to pursue
a few responsible parties, who then have a strong incentive to discover
and seek contribution from the remaining responsible parties. Despite a
traditional common law rule against contribution, most American jurisdictions, including New Mexico, have recognized a right of contribution
by statute or judicial decision." 9
The argument for a right of contribution under CERCLA'20 followed
two United States Supreme Court decisions that established the possibility
of contribution among parties jointly liable under a federal law if either
the statute expressly or clearly implies a right of action for contribution,
or if the courts establish a right of contribution through federal common
2
law based on the power to fashion appropriate remedies.' ' The courts
found authority for a CERCLA right of contribution in either the language
23 The federal common law
of the statute' 2 or federal common law.
argument is justified by the "unique federal interests" which are furthered
by a CERCLA right of contribution, which include the encouragement
124
of expeditious settlements and the preservation of Superfund monies.
While the Act does not explicitly create a right of contribution, New
Mexico is one of the many states that have adopted by statute a right
of contribution among joint tortfeasors. 25 The adoption of several liability
and comparative fault in New Mexico threw the usefulness of contribution
B.

117. In fact, full reimbursement would often be impossible due to the death, dissolution or
financial inability of parties associated with old facilities where much of the contamination will be
released.
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 886A (1979); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 336-41 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
119. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 118, at 338.
120. The original CERCLA passed in 1980 without any reference to contribution. In the 1986
SARA amendments, a right of contribution was specifically authorized. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0
(1986).
121. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1981).
122. E.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
123. E.g., State v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985).
124. United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1268-69 (D. Del. 1986).
125. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to -8 (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act).
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into question.' 26 The statute which reaffirmed the limited application of
joint and several liability, however, also reaffirmed the concomitant right
of contribution and amended the statutory contribution apportionment
27
provision to coincide with the principles of comparative fault.
If a New Mexico court applies joint and several liability to the Act,
the statutory right of contribution should follow. As previously discussed,
section 34 provides that "[n]othing in this section bars or replaces any
cause of action available to any person that existed before its enactment.
The causes of action of this section are supplemental to existing causes
of action.' ' 28 Therefore, the jointly and severally liable responsible parties
should have the right to seek contribution under the existing statute.
Does the contribution statute conflict with the Act's requirement that
a court apportion costs or damages "in accordance with equitable principles' '? 129 No such conflict should be inferred. Contribution is generally
viewed as an equitable concept, 30 and New Mexico courts have viewed
the contribution statute as seeking equitable results. 3 Under the contribution statute, a joint tortfeasor has a right of contribution against
other liable parties if they have discharged the common liability or paid
more than their pro rata share of the liability. 32 Presumably, a responsible
party who has conducted a cleanup under an Environment Department
enforcement order will have discharged the common liability. "Pro rata
share" has been changed from a per capita standard 33 to a "percentage
of fault" standard." 4
In a strict liability situation such as under the Act, a percentage of
fault standard will be difficult to apply. The New Mexico courts will
apportion liability on a case-by-case basis applying relevant equitable
principles. Congress, when it codified the right of contribution, assumed
that courts would consider any relevant criteria, including:
the amount of hazardous substances involved; the degree of toxicity
or hazard of the materials involved; the degree of involvement by
parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage or disposal
of the substances; the degree of care exercised by the parties with
respect to the substances involved; and the degree of cooperation of
the parties with government officials to prevent any harm to public
health or the environment.' 3'

126. See Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192,
668 P.2d 308 (1983).
127. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1989); Schultz & Occhialino, supra note
113, at 499-502.
128. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(H) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
129. Id. § 74-9-34(E).
130. See RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886A comment c (1979).
131. See Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, 95 N.M. 66, 618 P.2d 1230 (1980); Dessauer v.
Memorial Gen. Hosp., 96 N.M. 92, 628 P.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1981).
132. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
133. See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Western Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 93 N.M. 507, 601
P.2d 1203 (1979).
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
135. H.R. REp. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 at 19, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmN. NEws 3042.

Winter 1990]

SOLID WASTE LIABILITY

Other issues that may be considered when apportioning liability among
successive owners of a facility include the conditions of the sale, the
1 36
price paid and any discounts given for the condition of the property.
Similar criteria can be considered by a New Mexico court apportioning
liability in a contribution action.
C. Private Right of Action
Another method of encouraging contamination cleanups is to allow
private parties that clean up sites without governmental enforcement to
later sue responsible parties for recovery of the cleanup costs. CERCLA
specifically creates a private right of action for the recovery of response
costs. The responsible parties named by CERCLA are liable for the
response costs incurred by the government, for natural resource damages
and for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
courts have
person consistent with the national contingency plan. 1' 37 The
138
held that this provision creates a private right of action.
Private parties can respond to the contamination and seek reimbursement of their costs even without prior involvement or approval of the
government. 3 9 While this right of action clearly applies to "innocent"
parties (i.e., non-responsible parties), most courts have also allowed responsible parties to use this action to recover costs they incurred volto induce responsible parties to
untarily. 140 Congress intended CERCLA
4
voluntarily pursue cleanup actions.' 1
No such incentive for voluntary cleanups exists under the Act. The
Act imposes liability on the responsible parties for costs incurred only
by "this state or any of its counties or municipalities.''142 Without a
right to pursue other responsible parties for response costs that are
voluntarily incurred, a responsible party has little incentive to expend
funds in a cleanup prior to any response or enforcement activity by the
state or local authority. A private right of action would also encourage
landowners who have defenses to government enforcement to pursue
cleanups.
D. Indemnification
The Act allows indemnification agreements, but it does not allow a
responsible party to use the agreement to transfer liability under the

136. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1986).
138. E.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
139. E.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
140. E.g., Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984). But
see Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984) (doctrine of unclean
hands precludes potentially responsible party from using right of action).
141. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE. CONG. & ADMN.
Naws 6119-20.
142. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-9-34(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
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Act. 43 This provision in the Act is almost identical to language in
CERCLA.'" The courts have found that the indemnification provision
prevents a responsible party from denying statutory liability for response
costs, but it does not prevent the responsible party from seeking indemnification from another private party. 45 However, a court may require
that the contractual language expressly refer to the statute or to future
environmental liabilities before recognizing a contractual allocation of

liability. 14

VIII.

CONCLUSION

In the midst of a statute that establishes a framework for the future
management of solid waste in New Mexico, section 34 of the Act creates
a far reaching liability scheme for those who were associated with the
past failures to adequately manage solid waste disposal in New Mexico.
As the Act seeks to narrow the solid waste disposal facilities to a small
number of heavily regulated sites run by a closely watched permit holder,
section 34 casts a wide net over the hundreds, perhaps thousands of
locations where solid Waste was disposed in the past.
Section 34 will become an important, additional weapon in the state's
fight against the causes of ground and water pollution. The broad definition of "solid waste facility" may allow the application of section 34
to thousands of potential sources of contamination. Once section 34 is
available, the state has recourse against a wide variety of parties associated
with the facility, both in the past and the present, without any need to
show fault or negligence. Even though it is impossible to predict how
vigorously the state will attempt to enforce the Act, a few issues concerning
enforcement and other impacts of section 34 are worth noting.
While potential liability under the Act is enormous, the actual enforcement of cleanups may prove less effective unless the Act is modified
or regulations are promulgated. CERCLA, from which much of the
language of section 34 is adopted, provides three options for achieving
cleanups with little ultimate cost to the government. First, the government
can use Superfund monies to conduct the cleanup and then pursue
responsible parties for reimbursement. Second, the government can order
responsible parties to conduct the cleanups. Finally, CERCLA allows a
potentially resonsible party or other private party to conduct the cleanup
without government intervention and then obtain reimbursement from
other responsible parties.
At this point, only one of these options is effectively available under
the Act. While the Act names the parties liable for reimbursement of
governmental cleanup costs, no fund is created to allow the state to
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conduct the cleanups. If the courts fail to find the responsible parties
jointly and severally liable, a possibility which we have suggested in this
article may occur, the government will be forced to track down and sue
all of the responsible parties associated with a facility in order to be
fully reimbursed.
Section 34 also fails to provide a private right of action which would
create an incentive for a responsible party to conduct a cleanup and seek
reimbursement from other responsible parties before any governmental
involvement. Lacking that carrot, the state is left with the heavy stick
of ordering responsible parties to conduct the cleanup or face treble
damages in addition to the reimbursement of actual cleanup costs.
If the state relies on ordering responsible parties to provide removal
or remedial actions, the state will be under pressure to develop uniform
procedures and regulations covering the remedial actions. Without adequate uniform guidelines and with high cleanup costs, some responsible
parties may decide to challenge the enforcement actions of the state.
As news of this broad liability scheme spreads and the state begins to
initiate a few enforcement actions, section 34 may begin to have impacts
far beyond the cleanup of contaminated landfills. Like CERCLA, from
which the Act borrows many of its liability concepts, the Act may have
a significant impact on real estate and financing transactions in New
Mexico. Parties that are purchasing, foreclosing or lending on real estate
will need to increase their due diligence. Lenders, who receive no protection
under the Act, will be under great pressure to avoid liability traps that
may be associated with property once used for solid waste disposal.
Environmental assessments may become more common, and pressure will
be placed on the state and local governments to maintain information
on the location and extent of closed solid waste facilities.
The pressures on the market may, in the end, help achieve some of
the goals of the Act. Property which contains old landfills or simply
accumulations of trash will decrease in value or become more difficult
to transfer or use as collateral. Some property may be abandoned as
owners default on loans or go into bankruptcy, bankruptcy trustees
abandon the property, and lenders refuse to foreclose on the property.
For some larger landfill sites, the cost of removing and redepositing the
trash into an approved landfill will far exceed the value of the property.
On the other hand, smaller trash accumulations may be removed to legal
facilities or properly closed as lenders and purchasers require such actions
to complete transactions. Information about facilities across the state will
increase as they are discovered and investigated during transactions. Lenders and purchasers who discover illegal open facilities may require their
registration or closure.
In the end, who will pay for the contamination that results from our
past mismanagement of solid waste disposal? Most of the parties associated
with old landfills, including property owners, dump operators, and trash
haulers, have "shallow pockets" and will be unable to absorb all of the
costs associated with cleanups. For many of the older landfills, many
responsible parties will be difficult to track down, and the parties that
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presently own the property may decide to abandon it or seek protection
under the Bankruptcy Code. As the government and other responsible
parties search for deep pockets, attention may turn to banks and other
lenders who foreclosed on or simply hold security interests in the property
where the contaminated facility is located. Without the statutory exemption
provided by CERCLA for secured parties, lenders may be vulnerable to
enforcement and contribution claims for section 34 liability. If a trend
toward lender liability develops, the lenders may in turn put pressure on
the state legislature to amend the Act.
When the courts are called upon to apportion costs among the solvent
responsible parties, one category of responsible parties will be found at
most every site: the county or municipality. Local governments will
generally be liable for costs not only as a generator, but also as an
owner or operator of the facility. These governmental entities, which
face a heavy burden to implement the strict landfill procedures contemplated by the Act, may be forced to absorb much of the costs of paying
for past mistakes.

